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ABSTRACT 
This paper describes the background and provides the 
rationale and the framework to embrace all feasible 
measures (passive/design and active/operational – nor-
mal and emergencies) for improving the damage sur-
vivability of RoRo Passenger ships. The ideas elaborat-
ed in the paper is an attempt to elucidate and assess the 
impact on options for new and existing ships of increas-
ing the required subdivision index R, the former in re-
sponse to the higher damage stability standards recom-
mended following the conclusion of the EMSA III pro-
ject and the latter in case IMO decided to apply higher 
damage stability requirements retrospectively, particu-
larly in the aftermath of an accident. Such a framework 
would provide the motivation for instigating and estab-
lishing novel damage stability enhancing paradigms in 
line with IMO Circular 1455 on equivalents, for alter-
native compliance. This, in turn, would enable the in-
dustry to focus on all credible measures for damage 
stability enhancement in case of a flooding accident. 
This represents a step change both in the mind-set of 
naval architects and in safety legislation but the impact 
will be immense and mostly positive. This paper paves 
the way in this direction by providing the background 
and rationale for such a framework and by introducing 
an alternative system for damage stability enhancement 
that involves injecting highly expandable foam in the 
compartment(s) undergoing flooding during the intimal 
post-accident flooding phase thus enhancing damage 
stability and survivability of RoPax vessels well beyond 
the design levels in the most cost-effective way currently 
available. This is a mind-set changing innovation that is 
likely to revolutionise design and operation of most ship 
types and RoPax, in particular. A number of applica-
tions are considered in the paper for a range of ship 
sizes with impressive results that will challenge the cur-
rent established practice. 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Back in 1912 when RMS Titanic was sailing from South-
ampton, UK to New York, USA, the airplane had just been 
invented 9 years ago by the Wright brothers and ships were 
still using coal. The tragic loss of 1,513 people onboard a 
state-of-the-art for its time ship was a shock for the society 
and the maritime industry. This led to the adoption of the 
first International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea 
(SOLAS) of 1914, which over the last century is constantly 
improved and enhanced in its latest 1974 form. As a result, 
the shipping losses have been reduced from 1 ship per 100 
per year back in 1912 to about 1 ship per 672 per year in 
2014 (Allianz, 2015). Still, the societal outcry that follows 
every accident, especially in the case of passenger ships is 
tremendous with more recent examples the loss of Costa 
Concordia and Sewol. Tragedies such as these remind to 
both industry and academia that we have to do more in 
order to reduce the vulnerability of our ships in case of 
flooding. Unfortunately, our “arsenal” is still an enhanced 
version of the one that the naval architects had back in the 
dawn of the 20th century. Furthermore, due to the “grandfa-
ther clause”, major changes to SOLAS are applied mainly 
to newbuildings, which represent obviously a small fraction 
of the existing fleet. Thus, the state-of-the-art knowledge on 
damage stability inoculates very slowly the fleet at risk, 
leaving most of the ships with severe vulnerabilities and 
their passengers and crew unnecessarily to higher risk. This 
becomes even more woeful considering the continuously 
accelerating pace of today’s scientific and technological 
developments. As a result, our regulatory framework is 
becoming progressively less relevant and unable to keep up 
with this pace of development.  
 
However, the introduction of the probabilistic damage sta-
bility concept in its latest SOLAS 2009 (IMO 
MSC.Res.216(82), 2006) form provides an objective, au-
ditable way to measure the current risk and the improve-
ments made by any proposed risk reduction measures. Fur-
thermore, the realisation in IMO that the prescriptive regu-
lations prohibit the introduction of innovations in the design 
and the adoption of the Guidelines for the approval of al-
ternatives and equivalents (IMO MSC.1/Circ. 1455) pro-
vide the tools for a step improvement in the way ships are 
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designed with regards to their damage stability characteris-
tics. 
  
This paper presents an alternative system for damage stabil-
ity enhancement that involves injecting highly expandable 
foam in the compartment(s) undergoing flooding during the 
initial post-accident flooding phase thus enhancing damage 
stability and survivability of ships and especially RoPax 
vessels well beyond the current design levels in the most 
cost-effective way possible. 
 
BACKGROUND 
Since the introduction of the probabilistic model for the 
assessment of the survivability of ships and especially dur-
ing the last 15 years there have been multiple attempts from 
the industry and the academia to optimise the design of 
RoPax ships with multi-criteria design optimisation, using 
survivability after damage as an objective (Boulougouris, 
2004). In R&D projects such as ROROPROB (2000-2003), 
GOALDS (2009-2012) and more recently in the EMSA 3 
study (EMSA, 2015), the designers attempted to maximise 
the attained subdivision index for RoPax  vessels of vari-
ous sizes. In most of these cases, the designers had to in-
crease the breadth or the freeboard of the vessel by few 
centimetres, add bulkheads under the main deck, subdivide 
the car deck or add cross flooding devices in order to 
achieve tangible improvements in the attained subdivision 
index (EMSA, 2015). The problem is that many of these 
design changes proved to be not cost effective risk control 
options (RCOs) due to their high cost or their low risk re-
duction, surpassing the Net Cost of Averting a Fatality 
(NCAF) of 8mil USD (≈5.9mil€) which is widely accepted 
nowadays in the maritime industry (EMSA, 2015). These 
solutions have a significant impact on the CAPEX, OPEX, 
FUELEX, loss of revenues, but they may also have impact 
to the costs related to air emissions, upstream processes, 
climate change, harbour fees, salvage and loss of cargo. It is 
therefore obvious that the designers need new ‘tools’ in 
order to optimise their designs in a cost-effective way. 
Damage Stability Recovery System (DSRS) is such a solu-
tion.  
VULNERABILITY 
"Vulnerability" as concept is used extensively in the sur-
vivability assessment of naval ships (Boulougouris et.al., 
2016) but in merchant shipping is used as a term in the 2nd 
Generation of Intact Stability Criteria without been directly 
associated to probability. Hence, a definition here is in 
order. The way this term has been used for merchant ships 
at Strathclyde relates to "the probability that a ship may 
capsize or sink within a certain time when subjected to a 
feasible extreme flooding case" (Vassalos, 2014). In the 
probabilistic framework, it could be defined as: 
 
 vi = 1 – si  (1) 
  
where si is the probability of survival of the vessel in a 
particular damage case i. Therefore, vulnerability contains 
(and provides) information on every parameter that affects 
damage ship survivability. As a consequence, vulnerability 
is directly linked to risk. Using the probabilities of occur-
rence of each damage case, the total risk of losing the ves-
sel in case of damage can be calculated:  
 
 Total Risk =∑( ∙ )  (2) 
 
Similarly, the local risk associated with a particular damage 
case i can be calculated as: 
 Local Risk = ∙  =  ∙ (1 − )  (3) 
 
Vassalos (2012) underlines that the ship, as a system with 
multiple operational modes and conditions, has some de-
sign (nominal) characteristics and a number of operational 
ones which may modify its survivability at any given time 
(e.g. loading condition, open watertight doors, addition of 
cross flooding valves etc.). In that respect we should dis-
tinguish the design vulnerability of the ship to the opera-
tional one. An excellent example is the vulnerability distri-
bution of MV Estonia shown at her design condition (Fig. 
1) and at the time of her accident (Fig. 2). 
 
 
Fig. 1 MV Estonia - Design Vulnerability distribution 
(Vassalos, 2012) 
 
 
 
Fig. 2 MV Estonia - As Operated at the Time of her Loss 
(Vassalos, 2012) 
 
Reducing the vulnerability beyond the levels achievable by 
adding another bulkhead, closing the watertight doors or 
using cross flooding, requires a system that can provide 
some of lost buoyancy. DSRS is that system.   
 
DAMAGE STABILITY RECOVERY SYSTEM (DSRS) 
DSRS is a bespoke system releasing highly expandable 
foam in the flooding compartment(s) during the initial 
227 
post-accident flooding phase. It has been developed (patent 
pending) by the University of Strathclyde with the support 
from Scottish Enterprise. It can be fitted to new or retrofit-
ted to existing ships in order to reduce the likelihood of 
capsize/sinking and progressive flooding following a major 
flooding accident. 
 
The working principle of the proposed system is simple: 
when a vessel is subjected to a critical damage, stability is 
recovered through the reduction of floodable volume within 
the vessel’s high risk compartment(s). This is achieved by 
rapidly distributing fast setting, high expansion foam to the 
protected compartment(s), regaining lost buoyancy whilst 
also eliminating free surface effects and forming a near 
watertight seal over unprotected openings. Moreover, with 
water being constrained low in the ship, it actually increas-
es damage stability (higher GM). 
 
The system itself consists of a fixed supply of both foam 
resin and hardener agents; each stored within an individual 
tank and connected to a piping network for distribution. 
Different foam types have been considered and can be used 
depending on the specification of the system and the re-
quirements of the owner. For generic version of the system 
(see Fig. 3 and 4) the operation starts when two distribution 
pumps supply a flow of filtered sea water into individual 
resin and hardener lines. Both streams are then dosed with 
concentrated resin and hardener agents, before they each 
pass through a static mixer in order to produce a homoge-
neous solution of each component. 
 
 
Fig. 3 System Representation 
 
The two lines are then fed to the protected compartment 
where they meet and enter a foam generator. Here both 
streams mix and compressed air is introduced into the sys-
tem for the in situ production of foam. The foam is then 
passed in to a branched piping network within the vulnera-
ble compartment where both port and starboard side 
branches allow the foam distribution to the flooded room. 
 
The whole process is monitored and controlled by a central 
system linked to vital components and sensors. The system 
can cover one or multiple compartments and may have 
sufficient capacity for one or more compartments. The use 
of the system is under the full control of the crew, with a 
decision support system (DSS) available to help the ship’s 
master decide where and when the system will act as well 
as inform all concerned of the ensuing actions. 
 
The foam compound, the resin and the hardener meet all the 
environmental and health criteria, they is not harmful to 
humans and the foam’s release does not pose any danger to 
the people onboard or the environment. Furthermore the 
foam is non-flammable and in this respect could reduce risk 
by other event sequences such as a fire ignited in collision. 
The residual clean-up post system discharge is also aided 
by a foam dissolving agent ensuring minimal business in-
terruption. 
 
METHODOLOGY 
For the purposes of this study two ROPAX vessels, cur-
rently operating in European waters, have been investigated 
with a view to assess the effectiveness of the proposed 
Damaged Stability Recovery System (DSRS) as a risk re-
duction technology. The probabilistic approach to damage 
stability (SOLAS 2009) has been used as a means of estab-
lishing the initial level of risk associated with the designs. 
The effects of the DSRS have then been modelled and the 
vessels were re-examined in order to assess the risk reduc-
tion achieved by the system. 
 
DSRS IMPLEMENTATION & MODELLING 
 
In order to ascertain the impact of the proposed system on 
vessel safety, the designer has to identify the overall risk 
level associated with the vessel. From Eq. 2 we can easily 
associate the attained index A with the overall risk as: 
 
 = 1−  (4) 
 
This provides a benchmark to gauge any improvements on 
the vessel’s safety achieved by the use of the DSRS. 
 
In order to ensure the system is designed in the most effi-
cient manner, the system must target those compartments 
which represent the “Achilles heel” for the vessel i.e. con-
stitute the greatest risk. As such, a risk profile of the vessel 
is created in order to aid in the identification of design vul-
nerabilities.  
 
 
Fig 4 Example Risk Profile 
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The results from the probabilistic damage stability assess-
ment provide a straightforward way of determining the 
vessel’s risk profile by firstly considering the local risk 
associate with each damage scenario, as calculated by Eq. 3. 
These local risk values are then mapped across the vessel 
according to damage centre, in order to form the risk profile 
as shown in Fig. 4. 
 
In the above risk profile, risk is plotted on the vertical axis 
and the damage position along the horizontal. Differing 
lengths of damage, as measured by multiples of adjacent 
zones, are distinguished by marker type and colour. This 
enables the identification of both safety critical design spots 
and opportunities where safety could be improved most 
significantly and efficiently. Two cases in particular, circled 
in Fig. 4, are identified as large risk contributors. As such, it 
can be reasoned that the DSRS would be best applied in the 
protection of one if not both of the compartments which 
give rise to this risk. Following this methodology for the 
sample vessel, the system could be applied in the most 
efficient and effective manner. 
 
For the analysis, the vessel should initially be modelled 
accurately according to its nominal (design) conditions. 
Data such as lines and general arrangement plans are re-
quired. The relevant stability documentation is used in 
order to ensure that all unprotected and weather tight open-
ings are taken into account. Loading condition information 
within the vessel’s stability booklet is used in conjunction 
with the damage stability metacentric height (GM) limiting 
curves in order to select the SOLAS 2009 initial loading 
conditions. 
 
The required volume for the DSRS system is calculated 
through trade-off analysis of protected compartments’ per-
meability. The required volume of foam is then estimated 
based on the minimum volume required to save the ship in 
the most demanding high risk damage scenario. The opti-
mum volume can be estimated based on an Cost-Benefit 
Analysis (CBA) taking into account the cost of the system, 
the additional weight, the loss of carrying capacity (if any), 
and the achieved reduction of the risk as a function of foam 
volume, up to the threshold of the NCAF. Benefits from e.g. 
changing the payload distribution (e.g. more passengers) or 
increase in the earning potential of the ship due to im-
provements to the hotel arrangements should also be in-
cluded. An example of the trade-off between foam volume 
and risk is shown in Fig. 5.    
 
 
Fig. 5. Trade-off analysis between foam volume and Risk 
 
Following the analysis of a significant number of existing 
designs it has been proven that in the large majority, using 
the foam in one and two compartment would be sufficient 
for reducing substantially the risk of capsizing or founder-
ing in case of damage. Two of these studies will be pre-
sented here below. 
 
CASE STUDY: LARGE ROPAX 
Overview 
 
Starting from the most demanding in terms of foam volume 
requirements case, the DSRS team studied a large ROPAX 
with a central cased ro-ro deck suitable for drive-through 
operations, with a large lower hold spanning eight com-
partments under the main deck (see Fig. 6). The vessel is 
equipped with a hoistable car deck suitable for additional 
car storage. 
 
The vessel was built in 1998 to a two-compartment subdi-
vision standard according to SOLAS 90’ along with Stock-
holm agreement compliance with a significant wave height 
of 2.9m. Below the bulkhead deck the vessel is divided into 
a total of twenty water tight compartments and has pro-
nounced B/5 subdivision spanning almost the entire length 
of the vessel and cross flooding ducts fitted to enable sym-
metrical flooding. The vessel’s principal particulars and 
general arrangement are provided in Table 1 and Fig. 6. 
 
Table 1. Principal Particulars 
 
 
 
Fig. 6 General Arrangement 
 
 
 
 
Length o.a (m) 200.65 
Length b.p (m) 185.4 
Breadth (m) 25.8 
Draught MLD. (m) 6.8 
Displacement (t) 19468 
Deadweight (t) 5830 
Crew Number 200 persons 
Passenger Number 1500 persons 
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DSRS impact assessment 
 
In order to assess the damage stability performance of the 
vessel a total of 942 damage cases have been analysed 
under three loading conditions as outlined in Table 2. 
 
Table 2. Loading Conditions 
Displacement (t) Draft (m) GM (m) 
LC1 (dl) 19468 6.8 2.226 
LC2 (dp) 17412 6.4 2.003 
LC3 (ds) 15087 5.733 3.191 
 
The results of the SOLAS 2009 damage stability assess-
ment along with the required index value calculated for this 
vessel can be found in Table 3 below. The risk profile de-
rived for the vessel is also provided in Fig. 7. It is obvious 
that the SOLAS 90 + WOD requirements provide the ves-
sels with sufficient survivability in order to fulfil easily the 
SOLAS 2009 requirements. 
 
Table 3. SOLAS 2009 Results 
As 0.79 
Ap 0.80 
Al 0.96 
Attained index A 0.83 
Required index R 0.795 
 
 
Fig. 7. Risk Profile 
 
Still, a closer inspection of the vessels risk profile reveals 
several vulnerabilities existing within the vessel’s design. 
This risk is founded primarily by damages that penetrate 
beyond the B/5 longitudinal bulkhead of the lower hold. 
Damages involving this space were not covered by the 
regulations in place at the time although they do however 
present a significant threat to the vessel’s safety. 
 
Damage to the lower hold gives rise to large scale flooding 
leading to a significant reduction in the vessel’s residual 
stability. Having been identified as the largest risk contrib-
utor this space was selected for the application of the sys-
tem. 
 
The volume of foam required in this case was defined as 
that required to mitigate the risk stemming from two com-
partment damages involving the lower hold, equating 2000 
m3 expanded volume. The damage stability performance 
was then re-assessed following a permeability change to the 
lower hold to account for the effects of the foam. 
 
The new attained index values calculated in this case can be 
found in Table 4 along with the updated risk profile of the 
vessel highlighted in Fig. 8. 
 
Table 4. Attained Index after DSRS usage in 1-comp 
Al 0.96 
Ap 0.85 
As 0.84 
New Attained Index A 0.87 
 
 
Fig. 8. Updated Risk Profile 
 
It is clear from the newly calculated results that the effects 
of the system have resulted in a substantial reduction of risk. 
This is evident in the eradication of the risk contribution 
made by one and two compartment damages involving the 
vessel’s lower hold. The risk stemming from three com-
partment damages to this space has also been mitigated, 
particularly in those damages located closer to amidships. 
However, there still exists a series of high risk three com-
partment damages towards the fore of the lower hold and 
mitigation of these risks would call for a larger volume of 
foam to be utilised. In total the system has resulted in a 
24% risk reduction from 0.17 to 0.13 for a 1-compartment 
DSRS application. 
 
Selection of the second compartment for system protection 
involved re-evaluation of the vessel’s risk profile. Through 
doing so, the vessel’s main engine room was identified as 
the largest of the remaining risk contributors. This particu-
lar space has a large volume coupled with a high permea-
bility value leading to large scale flooding when damaged 
and serious diminishment of the vessel’s residual stability. 
 
As the one compartment system application required an 
already large volume of foam the decision was made to use 
a constant volume of available foam in the investigation of 
two compartment protection. As such, the volume of foam 
was shared between the two protected compartments in 
such cases that they were simultaneously damaged. When 
either of the protected compartments was damaged inde-
pendently the entire volume of foam was assumed to be 
used for the damaged compartment in question. 
 
230 
The damage stability results following this process are 
provided in Table 5 and the vessel’s updated risk profile is 
provided in Fig. 9. 
 
Table 5. Attained Index after DSRS usage in 2-comp 
Al 0.97 
Ap 0.86 
As 0.85 
New Attained Index A  0.88 
 
 
Fig. 9. Updated Risk Profile 
 
The results in this case show that the protection of two 
compartments has worked to mitigate the risk stemming 
from damages to the main engine room but failed to eradi-
cate these risks. In total, there has been a relative 5% addi-
tional risk reduction afforded by this further protection. In 
order to generate a more meaningful reduction in risk, ei-
ther a larger volume of foam would be required or the range 
of compartments served by the system would have to be 
increased. The system was however able to produce an 
overall risk reduction of almost 30% from 0.17 to 0.12. 
 
CASE STUDY: SMALL ROPAX 
Overview 
 
Investigating the effectiveness of the DSRS on the other 
end of the scale, a small ROPAX vessel was studied. It has 
side casings that run its length and the aft portion is open to 
allow the transportation of hazardous cargo. The vessel can 
accommodate a maximum of 550 passengers and is operat-
ed by a total of 30 crew members. The vessel was launched 
in 2010 fulfilling the probabilistic SOLAS 2009 standard 
along with the “water on deck” deterministic requirements 
mandated by the EU passenger ship directive 2003/25/EC 
(EC, 2003). The vessel is divided into three main vertical 
fire zones and subdivided into 12 watertight compartments 
below the bulkhead deck. Lifesaving appliances are pro-
vided for all 584 persons on board for domestic voyage, as 
a Class B vessel according the EU passenger ship directive 
2009/45/EC. The vessel is not equipped with life boats. The 
principal particulars of the vessel are provided in Table 11 
below along with the GA in Fig. 10. 
 
 
 
 
Table 11.  Small ROPAX Principal Particulars 
 
 
Fig. 10. Small ROPAX GA 
 
DSRS impact assessment 
 
For the assessment of the vessel’s damage stability perfor-
mance a total 533 damage cases were considered at three 
loading conditions. The results of the risk profile generated 
for the vessel in Fig. 11. 
 
The results from the damage stability assessment show a 
large disparity between the attained index value calculated 
and the required index value for the vessel (see Table 12). 
In this case the vessel’s is GM is limited dominantly across 
the three loading conditions by the requirements of the 
2008 IS code and as such the attained index value is much 
higher than that required by SOLAS 2009 regulation 7. 
 
 
Fig. 11. Small ROPAX original risk profile 
 
Still, vulnerabilities are identifiable within the vessel’s 
design. Observation of the vessel’s risk profile reveals that 
the stabiliser compartment and damages involving this 
Length Overall 89.48 m 
Length Btwn Perpendiculars  81.80 m 
Breadth 16.40 m 
Freeboard Draught 3.40 m 
Displacement 3434.6 t 
Deadweight 749.6 t 
Crew Number 34 persons 
Passenger Number 550 persons 
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space give rise to the large risk contributions. This particu-
lar space has a large volume coupled with a high permea-
bility value leading to large scale flooding when damaged 
and a serious diminishment of the vessel’s residual stability. 
As such, it was decided that this space should be investi-
gated for the 1-compartment application of the system.  
 
With a goal of eradicating the risk associated with 2 com-
partment damages to this space, the volume of foam af-
forded to the system was set at 365 m3. The damage stabil-
ity assessment was then re-conducted producing the results 
given in Table 12 and the updated risk profile in Fig. 12. 
 
Table 12. Attained Index before and after DSRS 
 
Original DSRS 1-comp 
Al 0.97 0.98 
Ap 0.9 0.926 
As 0.9 0.925 
New Attained Index A 0.91 0.94 
Required Index R 0.73 
 
 
Fig. 12. Small ROPAX new risk profile with DSRS 1-comp 
 
The system has again proven here to be greatly effective in 
increasing the vessel’s safety level. Observation of the 
vessel’s updated risk profile shows that the risk stemming 
from two compartment damages to the stabiliser compart-
ment has been eradicated. Furthermore, the risk associated 
with three compartment damages involving this space has 
been considerably reduced. In total the DSRS has achieved 
a risk reduction from 0.09 to 0.06 or 33%. 
 
In case a second compartment is protected by the system 
with additional foam, the updated risk profile suggests that 
this should be the shaft alternator room and the fin stabiliser 
compartment. Assuming that the foam could be delivered to 
either of the given compartments if damaged, a new 2 
DSRS compartment protection risk profile has been pre-
pared and the new total risk has been estimated to 0.047 or 
48% reduction from its original value. 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
The challenge faced by the maritime industry in the 21st 
century is to reduce drastically the loss of life in maritime 
transportation. The approach used in the 20th century has 
reached its plateau and a step change is required. The au-
thors argue that DSRS is the solution to this problem. This 
has been proven by the results presented herein. By com-
bining expertise in ship damage stability and specialist 
knowledge in expanding foams, a non-intrusive 
cost-effective solution to the damage stability problem of 
ROPAX vessels has been identified that does not interfere 
with the existing characteristics of the vessel, its functional-
ity or business model, enabling the vessel to remain com-
petitive while being above all safer. The system can be 
easily installed in new and existing ships and its technology 
is proven and reliable. 
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